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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FEIKENS, District Judge. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In this appeal, the central issue is whether S1956(a)(1) of 
Title 18 ("Laundering of monetary instruments") sets forth 
three separate offenses, each of which could be a basis for 
criminal conviction, or three alternative mental states, any 
of which being posssessed by a defendant would violate the 
statute. 
 
II. Background 
 
Luis Ricardo Navarro ("Navarro") and Porfirio Nunez- 
Vasquez ("Nunez") were charged by indictment 1 with, inter 
alia, one count of conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S1956(g) (Section 1956(g) has since been renumbered as 
S1956(h)). The object of the charged conspiracy was money 
laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. S1956(a)(1). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Other counts in the indictment are not relevant to the issues raised in 
this appeal. 
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Count 1 of the indictment charged defendants with 
 
       knowing that the property involved in the financial 
       transaction represented the proceeds of some form of 
       unlawful activity, and (A) with the intent to promote 
       the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity, that 
       is, the distribution of narcotics, and (B) knowing that 
       the transaction was designed in whole or in part to 
       conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
       ownership, and control of property believed to be the 
       proceeds of specified unlawful activity, and (C) knowing 
       that the transaction was designed in whole or in part 
       to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under 
       State or Federal law, did conspire and agree with one 
       another to conduct and attempt to conduct a financial 
       transaction which in fact involved the proceeds of 
       specified unlawful activity, specifically the transfer, 
       delivery, and other disposition of United States 
       currency in excess of $12,000,000 that was the 
       proceeds of the distribution of narcotics, contary to 
       Title 18, United States Code, section 1956(a)(1). 
 
Count 3 of the indictment charged that defendant Nunez, 
and others, did 
 
       knowingly, willfully, and with the intent (A) to promote 
       the carrying on of specified unlawful activity, that is, 
       the distribution of narcotics, (B) to conceal or disguise 
       the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of 
       property believed to be the proceeds of specified 
       unlawful activity, and (C) to avoid a transaction 
       reporting requirement under State or Federal law, 
       conspire and agree with one another to conduct and 
       attempt to conduct a financial transaction, specifically 
       the transfer, delivery, and other dispostion of United 
       States currency represented by a law enforcement 
       officer and by another person at the direction of and 
       with the approval of a Federal official authorized to 
       investigate and prosecute violations of Title 18, United 
       States Code, Section 1956, to be the proceeds of 
       specified unlawful activity, that is, the distribution of 
       narcotics, contrary to Title 18, United States Code, 
       Section 1956(a)(3). 
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        In violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 
       1956(g). 
 
In 1992, the government began an investigation into a 
money-transmitting business known as "Latino Envios," 
located in Union City, New Jersey. It also operated under 
the name "Lacino Travel." Latino Envios apparently had a 
relationship with "Richard," L.N.U., a money launderer 
connected to the Colombian Cali drug cartel. Latino Envios 
was managed by Robert Foti, who had a relationship with 
Richard, and, at Richard's direction, he established a 
branch office in San Juan, Puerto Rico. At that location, 
Foti and his wife Rosario hired defendant Nunez to run the 
Puerto Rico office at a salary of $700 a week. Defendant 
Navarro is alleged to be the brother of Richard and acted as 
one of his representatives in dealing with the Foti 
organization. On several occasions, Navarro delivered 
money to Foti and Nunez in Puerto Rico and New York. 
These cash deliveries were large, $500,000 or more. The 
deliveries were typically made during early morning hours 
or at night. The money would be taken by couriers in cars 
and the deliveries were made in garages, motel rooms, or 
fast-food parking lots. Nunez admitted to U.S. Customs 
Agent Jose Pena that he concluded that the money he 
processed was derived from drugs. 
 
After being counted by Nunez, Foti, or both, the money 
was then deposited in various banks, including Eurobank 
or Banco Bilbao, as well as other banks in the United 
States. Thereafter, the money was converted into checks, 
made out to a predetermined payee, or wire transferred to 
other banks, in accordance with instructions from Navarro 
or Richard. Between July 6, 1993 and December 10, 1993, 
fourteen monetary transactions, totaling $5,256,004, took 
place in Puerto Rico. 
 
At trial, government investigator George Serrano testified 
that a confidential informant told Nunez that he would be 
dealing with narcotics proceeds. Moreover, Foti had told 
Nunez that all involved had to be careful. In the Puerto Rico 
office, Nunez had arranged for blankets to be hung on the 
walls so that conversations about the funds involved could 
not be heard by those in adjoining offices. 
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At trial, telephone conversations were introduced in 
which there were constant references to code words and 
slang, which Foti described as repeated efforts to conceal 
that the talk was about narcotics proceeds. He gave a 
detailed description of the money laundering scheme in 
which co-conspirators would write checks against accounts 
into which they had deposited cash drug proceeds and 
direct those checks to payees whose indentities did not 
matter as long as the payee was one of a group of payees 
selected by drug dealers. He testified that Navarro told him 
that Navarro was moving money for a family business, and 
that Navarro's father's position was that if people in the 
United States wanted to use drugs, the Navarro family was 
not responsible for their actions. 
 
The indictment was handed down in December 1993. Foti 
pleaded guilty in May 1994. Nunez and Navarro went to 
trial in November 1994. Nunez was convicted of conspiracy 
to commit money laundering of drug proceeds in violation 
of Title 18, U.S.C., S1956(g) (now (h)), Count 1, and 
conspiracy to commit money laundering with funds 
represented by a law enforcement officer to be proceeds of 
narcotics distribution in violation of Title 18, U.S.C., 
S1956(g) (now (h)), Count 3. 
 
Navarro was also found guilty on Count 1 of the 
indictment, Title 18, U.S.C., S1956(g) (now (h)). 
 
III. Statement of the Issues Presented by this Appeal: 
 
       (1) whether the government's opening and closing 
       statements, which focused on one of three possible 
       intended objectives of the money laundering 
       conspiracy, constructively amended the 
       indictment; 
 
       (2) whether the district court correctly charged the 
       jury on unanimity; 
       and 
 
       (3) whether there was sufficient evidence viewed in 
       the light most favorable to the government to 
       support Nunez's conviction for conspiring to 
       launder drug proceeds. 
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IV. Analysis 
 
Title 18, U.S.C., S1956, entitled "Laundering of monetary 
instruments," states: 
 
       (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the property involved  in a 
       financial transaction represents the proceeds of some 
       form of unlawful activity, conducts or attempts to 
       conduct such a financial transaction which in fact 
       involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity -- 
 
        (A)(i) with the intent to promote the carrying on of 
       specified unlawful activity, or 
 
        (ii) with intent to engage in conduct constituting a 
       violation of section 7201 or 7206 of the Internal 
       Revenue Code of 1986; or 
 
        (B) knowing that the transaction is designed in whole 
       or in part -- 
 
        (i) to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
       source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of 
       specified unlawful activity; or 
 
        (ii) to avoid a transaction reporting requirement 
       under State or Federal law, shall be sentenced to afine 
       of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the 
       property involved in the transaction, whichever is 
       greater, or imprisonment for not more than twenty 
       years, or both. 
 
Title 18, U.S.C., S1956(h), states: 
 
       Any person who conspires to commit any offense 
       defined in this section or section 1957 shall be subject 
       to the same penalties as those prescribed for the 
       offense the commission of which was the object of the 
       conspiracy. 
 
Issue 1 - Whether the government's opening and closing 
statements, which focused on one of three possible 
intended objectives of the money laundering conspiracy, 
constructively amended the indictment. 
 
During her opening statement, the prosecutor discussed 
the evidence that she would present, and she alluded to the 
charges in the indictment. She emphasized the distinction 
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between money laundering and currency transaction 
reporting requirements, and she explained that "[t]he Judge 
will give you instructions at the end of the case concerning 
exactly what elements you need to find in each of those 
violations, and I can't and won't try to steal his thunder in 
that regard." Nonetheless, she remarked, "Very briefly, 
money laundering is the knowing conducting of afinancial 
transaction knowing that that cash comes from an illegal 
source, one of which is narcotics, and intending to conceal 
or disguise the source of those funds." She later reiterated 
that "I am not going to try to tell you now all of the 
elements that the Government must prove with respect to 
[Count 1]." 
 
Before closing arguments, the court briefly summarized 
each count of the indictment and generally described the 
notion of conspiracy. It then addressed the specific 
elements of money laundering, explaining that the 
defendants must have 
 
       acted either, (A) with the intent to promote the carrying 
       on of specified unlawful activity, or (B), knowing that 
       the transaction was designed in whole or in part to 
       conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, 
       ownership or control of the proceeds of specified 
       unlawful activity, or (C), knowing that the transaction 
       was designed in whole or in part to avoid a transaction 
       reporting requirement under state or federal law. 
 
In her summation, the prosecutor returned to the 
elements of money laundering, explaining as follows: 
 
       I am not going to go through all three of [the 
       subsections on knowledge and intent in the money 
       laundering statute] because I think that is not 
       necessary. One of those should suffice. I am going to 
       read you that one, that the defendant acted knowing 
       that the transaction was designed in whole or in part 
       to conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the 
       source, the ownership or the control of the proceeds 
       [of] specified unlawful activity, knowing, that is, that 
       the transaction was designed to conceal the source of 
       the funds. 
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The defendants argue that the government's opening and 
closing statements narrowed the indictment by focusing on 
one of three possible alternative mental states -- knowing 
concealment -- and the court's presentation of the full 
indictment to the jury, allowing conviction on any one of 
the three possible alternative mental states, violated their 
right to due process. This argument was not raised at trial; 
therefore, we will review the court's submission of the 
money laundering instruction for plain error in accordance 
with United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). Under 
this standard, there must be (1) an error; (2) which is clear 
or obvious; and (3) which affects substantial rights (i.e., it 
affected the outcome of the district court proceedings). See 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-34 (1993). 
Because Rule 52(b) is permissive, we only correct a plain 
error which (a) causes the conviction or sentencing of an 
actually innocent defendant, or (b) seriously affect[s] the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. Id. at 735-36; United States v. Stansfield, 101 
F.3d 909, 920 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 
We need not proceed any further than the first element of 
the plain error test -- we find that the court committed no 
error by presenting a money laundering instruction making 
reference to all three alternative mental states. It did not 
thereby impose a "constructive amendment" to the 
indictment. A constructive amendment occurs when the 
defendant is deprived of his "substantial right to be tried 
only on charges presented in an indictment returned by a 
grand jury." United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 140 
(1985) (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 217 
(1960)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The defendants 
here were tried on an indictment that clearly set out the 
offense for which they were ultimately convicted, and the 
indictment was never constructively amended at any point 
before, during, or after trial. 
 
We reject the defendants' argument that the prosecutor's 
opening and closing remarks focusing on knowing 
concealment narrowed the charge to only that one mental 
state. The prosecutor clearly stated that she was not going 
to address each of the three possible alternative mental 
states in her opening and closing remarks. She carefully 
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avoided conveying an intent to narrow the charge, and it 
would not have been reasonable for the defendants to rely 
on the government's statements as notice of an intention to 
narrow the indictment. Accordingly, the indictment was 
never narrowed, the district court's charge to the jury 
cannot be viewed as having expanded it, and the 
indictment was therefore not constructively amended. 
 
Issue 2 - Did the district court correctly charge the jury 
on unanimity? 
 
Defendants contend that the district court erred by 
failing to instruct the jurors that they must unanimously 
decide which of the alternative mental states set forth in 
S1956(a)(1) defendants possessed. As noted above, to 
constitute a violation of the statute the defendant must 
undertake a financial transaction involving proceeds known 
to be from a specified unlawful activity: 
 
       1) With the intent to promote the carrying on of a 
       specified unlawful activity (the promotion prong); or 
 
       2) Knowing that the transaction was designed in 
       whole or in part to conceal the nature, location, 
       ownership, etc. of the proceeds (the conceal or 
       disguise prong); or 
 
       3) Knowing that the transaction was designed to avoid 
       a transaction reporting requirement under state or 
       federal law (the reporting requirement prong). 
 
Although defendants were charged with possessing all three 
mental states (the indictment was written in the 
conjunctive), the jury was instructed in the disjunctive: 
 
       The third element of the offense which the Government 
       must prove is satisfied by any one of three alternatives: 
       The Government must prove beyond a reasonable 
       doubt either that the defendant acted with the intent to 
       promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity 
       or that he acted knowing that the transaction was 
       designed, in whole or in part, to conceal or disguise the 
       nature, the location, the source, the ownership or 
       control of the proceeds, or that he acted knowing that 
       the transaction was designed in whole or in part to 
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       avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state 
       or federal law. 
 
The jury was not told specifically that it must 
unanimously decide which mental state each defendant 
possessed. 
 
Defendants argue that S1956(a)(1) actually creates three 
separate offenses for promotion, concealment, and 
avoidance of reporting requirements -- as opposed to 
setting forth a single offense which can be violated by any 
one of the three mental states. Accordingly, they contend 
that the district court should have specifically instructed 
the jury that it must unanimously decide which mental 
state they possessed. Although the district court gave the 
jury a general unanimity instruction, its failure to provide 
this specific instruction, defendants maintain, requires a 
reversal because the instructions given create a risk of a 
patchwork verdict. That is, if the defendants are correct, 
and S1956(a)(1) sets forth three different offenses, then the 
lack of a specific unanimity instruction could yield a guilty 
verdict even though all twelve jurors did not agree on which 
provision of S1956(a)(1) was violated. The government 
counters that S1956(a)(1) does not create multiple offenses, 
only alternative mental states, and therefore the risk of a 
patchwork verdict is illusory. 
 
Put differently, defendants' challenge is to the district 
court's characterization of S1956(a)(1) as a single crime, as 
to which the verdict need not be limited to any one 
statutory mens rea alternative. Defendants did not raise 
this objection to the jury charge at trial. Thus, we review for 
plain error. 
 
A. Schad and Edmonds 
 
Our analytic point of departure on this issue is Schad v. 
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 243 (1991). The defendant 
in that case was convicted under an Arizona statute which 
defined first-degree murder as being either (a) willful, 
deliberate, or premeditated, or (b) committed in the course 
of certain felonies. See Schad, 501 U.S at 628. The state 
court determined that the statute defined only one crime, 
and that, therefore, the jury need not unanimously decide 
which of the two options (a felony murder or a premeditated 
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murder) had occurred. The Supreme Court affirmed, with a 
four-Justice plurality rejecting the defendant's contention 
that the trial court erred by not requiring the jury to 
unanimously agree on a single theory of first-degree 
murder. 
 
The plurality held that when a criminal statute provides 
alternative routes to a conviction, whether jurors must be 
unanimous with respect to a particular route is dependent 
on two questions. First, did the legislature intend to create 
different offenses or different means for violating a single 
offense? Second, if the legislature intended to create 
different means for violating the same offense, is that 
statutory definition constitutional under the Due Process 
Clause? See Schad, 501 U.S. at 632-33, 636-37, 640. 
Applying this approach, the plurality found that the Arizona 
legislature's intent to create a single offense with alternative 
mental states was clear, and that this definition of first- 
degree murder did not offend due process. The Court's due 
process inquiry looked to history and wide practice as 
guides to fundamental values, as well as to narrower 
analytic methods of testing the moral and practical 
equivalence of alternative means of satisfying an element of 
an offense. Schad, 501 U.S. at 637. 
 
We expounded upon and applied the first prong of the 
Schad framework in United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810 
(3d Cir. 1996) (en banc).2 In that case we analyzed whether 
the three predicate crimes required to establish a violation 
of the Continuing Criminal Enterprise ("CCE") statute, 21 
U.S.C. S848, were intended to be treated as different means 
or different offenses -- in other words, whether the jury 
must unanimously decide which three predicate acts were 
committed. Since the text and legislative history of the CCE 
statute offered little guidance on Congress' intent, we set 
forth a set of background interpretive principles to guide 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. We noted in Edmonds our doubt over the usefulness of the legislative 
intent prong of Schad. See 80 F.3d at 818 n.10. We expressed a 
preference instead for an inquiry into whether the differences between 
the statutory alternatives are so important that the lack of jury 
agreement as to a specific alternative casts too much doubt on the 
accuracy of the verdict. Id. 
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our application of Schad's legislative intent prong. Those 
principles are: 
 
       1) The historical tradition in criminal jurisprudence 
       that a jury verdict represents substantial 
       agreement on a discrete set of (actions occurring at 
       a single place at some specific time; 
 
       2) Constitutional considerations suggesting that we 
       should construe Congress' intent so as to avoid 
       grave and doubtful constitutional questions;3 and 
 
       3) The rule of lenity, counseling that the degree of 
       jury unanimity required is important enough a 
       protection that we hesitate to interpret an 
       ambiguous statute to require less, rather than 
       more, unanimity. 
 
Id. at 818-821. Based on these principles, we concluded in 
Edmonds that when a statute combines formerly distinct 
offenses into a single crime as predicate offenses, we should 
assume that Congress intended the formerly distinct 
offenses to retain their offense status with its attendant 
unanimity requirements. Id. at 822.4 
 
B. Application of Schad and Edmonds - Legislative Intent 
 
Our threshold inquiry is to determine whether Congress 
intended to create separate offenses or separate means of 
committing the same offense when it drafted the alternative 
mental state provisions of the money laundering statute. 
This inquiry, like our inquiry in Edmonds, is made difficult 
by two facts. First, the intent of Congress cannot be readily 
inferred from the face of the text of S1956. Second, the 
legislative history is similarly unhelpful, as no relevant 
congressional reports were submitted with the original 
enactment of the statute in 1986. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We identified two primary considerations to be assessed under this 
prong: first, whether there is a historical analogue for interpreting the 
statutory alternatives as different means of committing a single offense; 
and, second, the Schad plurality's belief that different means must 
reflect notions of equivalent blameworthiness or culpability. See 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 819-20. 
 
4. We also held that harmless error review could apply in this context. 
See Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 824. 
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       1. Case Law Guidance 
 
Although the legislative history is unavailing, other cases 
have suggested how we should construe Congress' intent 
behind S1956(a)(1). The case that speaks to this issue most 
directly is United States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150 (2d Cir. 
1995). There, the defendant was charged with two separate 
counts of violating S1956, S1956(a)(1)(B)(i) (the conceal or 
disguise provision) and (ii) (the reporting requirements 
provision), arising out of the same underlying misconduct. 
The court in Holmes rejected the argument that the same 
financial transaction could give rise to two separate crimes 
under these provisions: 
 
       We cannot accept the government's implicit contention 
       that the same financial transaction gives rise to 
       separate crimes simply because the defendant, at the 
       time he deposited the money, knew that what he was 
       doing -- the prohibited conduct -- was designed for 
       two unlawful purposes: concealing proceeds and 
       avoiding reporting requirements. The statute punishes 
       the conducting of a financial transaction with guilty 
       knowledge. Having knowledge of two improper purpses 
       rather than one does not multiply the offense of a 
       single financial transaction into two offenses. 
 
Id. at 1155. Accordingly, the court concluded that 
 
       given the language of S1956, congress must be deemed 
       to have intended only a single punishment for each 
       transaction even though the defendant may have had 
       two improper purposes in mind. 
 
Id. at 1155-56. We note, however, that this conclusion was 
based only on the court's reading of the text of the statute; 
the opinion does not cite to any legislative history or other 
texts influencing its decision. 
 
Although not with the clarity of Holmes, other circuits 
have reached the same essential result. In United States v. 
Brown, 944 F.2d 1377 (7th Cir. 1991), for example, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered a 
set of factual circumstances similar to the present case. 
The indictment charged that the defendant violated both 
the promotion and conceal or disguise subsections of 
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S1956(a)(1), but the government's proof and argument, as 
well as the trial court's instructions, only discussed the 
conceal or disguise alternative. The court held that "[t]he 
possibility that the jury nevertheless based its verdict on 
the [promotion prong] ... though troubling in the abstract, 
is not fatal to the conviction ...." Id. at 1387. 
 
Although Brown appears to support the alternate means 
interpretation of S1956, the Seventh Circuit was clearly 
uncomfortable with that result: 
 
       [W]e renew our caution ... that the government should 
       in the usual case charge defendants under one prong 
       of the statute or another as it will be the rare case in 
       which the government will be able to prove that a 
       single transaction was intended to promote an illegal 
       activity and conceal the origin of the funds used in that 
       activity. 
 
Id. While this statement demonstrates some pause on 
behalf of the court, it does not undermine the Seventh 
Circuit's basic conclusion that Congress intended that the 
jury could be instructed in the disjunctive. See also United 
States v. Alford, 999 F.2d 818, 824 (5th Cir. 1993) 
(rejecting without discussing, under plain error standard, 
defendant's claim that specific unanimity instruction is 
required in indictment for violation of subsections (a)(i) and 
(B)(i)). 
 
We have not clearly weighed in on this question. 
Defendants point us to two cases which they contend 
reflect a belief that Congress intended the S1956 
alternatives at issue to be treated as separate offenses. 
They rely principally on United States v. Paramo, 998 F.2d 
1212 (3d Cir. 1993). There, the defendant was convicted of 
five counts of violating subsection (A)(i) (the promotion 
alternative). Although not charged with violating subsection 
(B)(i) (or, for that matter, (B)(ii)), Paramo contended that the 
trial court had erred by failing to instruct the jury that they 
could not convict him under S1956(a)(1)(A)(i) if they found 
him guilty under S1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Paramo, 998 F.2d at 
1218, n.3. We rejected this claim in the margin, noting that 
"contrary to Paramo's suggestion, a finding of guilt under 
subsection (B)(i) is not a defense to a prosecution under 
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subsection (a)(i)." Id. at n.3. Defendants contend that the 
Paramo footnote stands for the proposition that a defendant 
could be prosecuted separately under the promotion and 
concealment subsections, and that the Paramo panel must 
have concluded that Congress intended those subsections 
to be treated as separate offenses. 
 
In our view, the Paramo footnote is insufficiently clear to 
compel a reversal here on a plain error standard of review. 
The proposition that Paramo rejected is that a jury could 
not convict a defendant under subsection (A)(i) if they found 
him guilty under subsection (B)(i). As noted above, Paramo 
stated that a finding of guilt under subsection (B)(i) is not 
a defense to a prosecution under subsection (A)(i). This 
footnote admits of two possible readings. It could mean 
either that the (A)(i) prosecution would not be barred on 
double jeopardy grounds -- which would imply that (A)(i) 
and (B)(i) are separate offenses with distinct elements -- or 
simply that a S1956(a)(1) defendant cannot defend the 
charge that he intended to promote an unlawful activity by 
claiming that he actually intended only to conceal or 
disguise the proceeds from that activity. In other words, a 
finding of intent to conceal under subsection (B)(i) is not 
inconsistent with a finding of intent to promote under 
subsection (A)(i). If Paramo means the latter, then its 
holding would be entirely consistent with the view that 
S1956(a)(1) sets forth separate means of committing a 
single offense. 
 
In light of the fact that Paramo was not charged with 
violating subsection (B)(i), and had not (at least as appears 
from the opinion) been charged with a (B)(i) violation based 
on the same conduct in the past, we are hesitant to 
conclude that the panel in Paramo was reaching out to 
decide a novel double jeopardy issue (without any 
discussion) which was not squarely before it. Moreover, we 
believe that the second interpretation of the Paramo 
footnote -- which need not be predicated on afinding that 
Congress intended to create separate offenses -- is more 
plausible. We recognize, however, that the import of Paramo 
is unclear. Since we are reviewing the defendants' 
conviction for plain error, though, we are not persuaded 
that the Paramo footnote itself satisfies defendants' burden 
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under Olano of demonstrating that Congress clearly 
intended S1956(a)(1) to create three separate offenses. 
 
Unlike Paramo, defendants' second case, United States v. 
Conley, 37 F.3d 970 (3d Cir. 1994), is not of much moment. 
Conley only states that to violate S1956(a)(1), the 
transaction must be committed with the intent either to 
promote the specified unlawful activity or to conceal the 
nature and source of the income. Id. at 978. This certainly 
is an accurate statement, but it does not stand for the 
proposition defendants urge -- namely, that we have 
recognized two separate offenses under S1956. Conley only 
restates the question. 
 
       2. The Edmonds Interpretive Principles 
 
Since the text and the legislative history do not provide 
insight as to whether Congress intended in S1956(a)(1) to 
create separate offenses or separate means of committing a 
single offense, we turn for guidance to the three interpretive 
principles which we applied in Edmonds. Thefirst principle 
(noted supra) is the general historical tradition that a jury 
verdict represents substantial agreement on a discrete set 
of actions, generally committed at a specific place at some 
specific time. We also noted in Edmonds that criminal 
statutes and the common law have also generally defined 
crimes both in terms of this discrete set of actions and 
accompanying mental states. Id. at 818-19. Of course, as 
Schad indicates, a statute that sets forth alternative mental 
states that could accompany the same set of actions does 
not necessarily belie this historical tradition. Thus, we 
conclude that this interpretive principle would not clearly 
bar a finding of separate means here, because, unlike 
Edmonds, we deal in the present case only with alternative 
mental states, and not with alternative courses of conduct 
accompanied by different mental states. In other words, on 
the first principle this case is more like Schad than 
Edmonds. 
 
Generally speaking, we avoid statutory constructions that 
raise grave and doubtful constitutional questions. See 
Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 819. Accordingly, under the second 
interpretive principle, we examine whether either competing 
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construction of the statute would raise such concerns as a 
matter of due process. Taking our cues from Schad, we 
stated in Edmonds that in order to conduct this analysis, 
we must assess whether the alternative means are so 
morally disparate as to offend the considerations of 
historical practice and equivalent blameworthiness which 
underpin due process. On the historical practice axis, while 
we are not presented here with a criminal statute with a 
rich common law or statutory history, see infra, there are 
certainly analogous circumstances where single offenses 
with alternative mental states have been permitted. In fact, 
we need look no further than the murder statute at issue 
in Schad itself. Thus, a historical inquiry would not appear 
to militate in favor of the separate offense construction. 
 
We similarly find little doubt cast on the separate means 
construction of S1956(a)(1) by an equivalent 
blameworthiness analysis. We would be hard-pressed to 
find that the level of culpability among the promotion, 
conceal or disguise, and reporting requirement alternatives 
is morally disparate in any significant sense. Indeed, the 
avoidance of reporting requirements strikes us as but one 
method of concealing large amounts of illicit proceeds, and 
to conceal illegal activity is to promote that activity in an 
important sense. As these brief comments demonstrate, the 
three mental states are closely related, and construing 
them as various means of committing the same offense 
would appear consistent with due process. 
 
The third principle is the rule of lenity. As in Edmonds, 
the ambiguity on the face of the statute, combined with the 
lack of relevant legislative history, would counsel us to 
apply the rule of lenity and construe the statute in favor of 
the defendants. See Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 820-21. In 
Edmonds, we note, the rule of lenity was read in 
conjunction with findings on the other two interpretive 
principles supportive of the defendant's claim. It was this 
combination, rather than the rule of lenity standing alone, 
that lead us to read the CCE statute to require jury 
unanimity on each predicate offense. Id. at 821-22. In the 
present case, however, the other two principles suggest that 
we should accept the government's interpretation of the 
statute, and the mere application of the rule of lenity in 
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these circumstances is insufficient to compel a different 
result. Thus, our Edmonds analysis leads us to the 
conclusion that Congress intended the S1956(a)(1) 
alternatives to be construed as separate means of 
committing the same offense. 
 
The foregoing discussion should not be construed as 
cutting back on our aspirational pronouncement in 
Edmonds that Congress should speak clearly (unlike here) 
when it wants to create alternative means of committing the 
same offense, and that the failure to speak clearly will 
counsel a finding of separate offenses. In this case, 
however, defendants simply cannot demonstrate that the 
Edmonds principles would support their reading even in the 
absence of an amendment to the statute providing a clear 
statement to the contrary. 
 
C. Application of Schad - Due Process 
 
Under Schad, once we have determined that the 
legislature intended to create different means for violating 
the same offense, we must assess whether that statutory 
definition is constitutional as a matter of due process. 
Although the Schad plurality did not exhaustively define 
the universe of those considerations potentially relevant to 
judgments, it did suggest that the core of the analysis is an 
examination of (1) history and widely shared practice as 
indicators of what fundamental fairness and rationality 
require; and (2) the equivalent blameworthiness and 
culpability of the alternatives. See Schad, 501 U.S. at 640- 
42, 645. We recognize that these are the same factors that 
we have applied in our legislative intent analysis under 
Edmonds, supra; the difference is that our analysis under 
the second Schad prong is generally more searching, as we 
must decide whether the legislature's construction actually 
violates due process, rather than expressing a preference 
for the construction which is more likely to avoid 
constitutional questions. 
 
       1. Historical Practice 
 
As in Edmonds, there is no clear historical analogue to 
the federal money laundering statute. The Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 
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SS1351-52, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-18, defines and prohibits 
for the first time a category of activity known as money 
laundering. See Max Kaufman, et al., Money Laundering, 34 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 793, 794 (1997). The legislation has its 
origins in three otherwise disparate doctrinal threads: (a) 
an evolving law of conspiracy; (b) forfeiture law; and (c) law 
enforcement authorities' perceived difficulties with 
enforcement of the currency transaction reporting 
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C.SS5311- 
5324 (1988). See G. Richard Strafer, Money Laundering: 
The Crime of the 90's, 27 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 149, 150 
(1989); see also Scott Sultzer, Money Laundering: The Scope 
of the Problem and Attempts to Combat It, 63 Tenn. L. Rev. 
143 (1995) (discussing background of money laundering 
legislation). As Schad noted, historical analysis will be "less 
useful as a yardstick in cases dealing with modern 
statutory offenses lacking clear common-law roots than it is 
in cases ... that deal with crimes that existed at common 
law." Schad, 501 U.S. at 640 n.7. That is precisely the case 
here. While the mere novelty of the statute does not 
insulate it from the type of critical examination which 
Schad mandates that we conduct to determine whether this 
statutory definition is fundamentally fair and rational, id. at 
643, defendants have failed to persuade us that history 
demands construing S1956(a)(1) as creating separate 
offenses in order to satisfy due process. 
 
As noted supra, we are not faced with a statute like the 
CCE statute at issue in Edmonds, which involved the 
potential interpretation of alternative predicate offenses as 
different means of violating a single continuing series 
element. Instead, we are presented with a statute which, 
like the murder statute at issue in Schad, sets forth 
alternative mental states. If we examine the law of 
conspiracy -- one historical keystone for S1956-- it is clear 
that when a jury returns a general guilty verdict on a 
multiple-object conspiracy count, the conviction will stand 
over Fifth Amendment due process objections so long as 
there is sufficient evidence to support any one of the 
objects of the conspiracy. United States v. Conley, 92 F.3d 
157, 163 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Griffin v. United States, 502 
U.S. 46, 56-57 (1991)); Edmonds, 80 F.3d at 839 (Garth, J. 
concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also United 
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States v. Vastola, 989 F.2d 1318, 1330 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(discussing Griffin). In the present case, defendants were 
charged with conspiring to money launder, and thus the 
alternative mental states act essentially as surrogates for 
the objects of the conspiracy. In that sense, the Conley- 
Griffin analysis of multiple-object conspiracy counts 
provides an apt historical analogue for the statutory 
scheme at issue here, and counsels that a specific 
unanimity instruction should not be constitutionally 
required. We would be hard-pressed to find that historical 
analysis clearly would compel the conclusion that the 
separate means construction of S1956 violates due process. 
 
       2. Equivalent Blameworthiness 
 
The second due process requirement, according to Schad, 
is that different means of committing the same offense, for 
which unanimity is not required, must reflect notions of 
equivalent blameworthiness or culpability. See Schad, 501 
U.S. at 643. The proper critical question, Schad informs us, 
is not whether the three alternative means are moral 
equivalents in all possible cases; the question is whether 
the alternatives could ever be treated as the equivalents of 
each other. Id. at 643-44. As the Supreme Court stated: 
 
       Whether or not everyone would agree that the mental 
       state that precipitates death in the course of robbery is 
       the moral equivalent of premeditation, it is clear that 
       such equivalence could reasonably be found, which is 
       enough to rule out the argument that this moral 
       disparity bars treating them as alternative means to 
       satisfy the mental element of a single offense. 
 
Id. at 644-45. We are persuaded that the same conclusion 
obtains here. We have little doubt that the intent to 
promote an unlawful activity can reasonably be found to be 
the moral equivalent of the intent to conceal or disguise the 
proceeds from such an activity. Indeed, those intents will, 
in many cases, be coextensive. Similarly, the intent to 
conceal or disguise and the intent to avoid reporting 
requirements could reasonably be found to be morally 
equivalent in the majority of cases.5 Thus, we cannot 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Defendants argue that finding moral equivalence here ignores the 
nature of the three alternatives, since, they contend, there is a 
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conclude that the different routes of violating the statute 
are so morally disparate that a legislature cannot 
constitutionally treat them as mere means. See Edmonds, 
80 F.3d at 820. Thus, the separate means construction 
does not plainly violate due process. 
 
D. Jury Confusion 
 
Defendants further contend that their verdicts should be 
reversed on the ground that the jury charge, because of the 
lack of a specific unanimity instruction, was capable of 
confusing and misleading the jury, citing our opinion in 
Bennis v. Gable, 823 F.2d 723, 727 (3d Cir. 1987). The 
basis for this contention is the fact that, although the 
money laundering statute is written -- and the jury was 
instructed -- in the disjunctive, the indictment was drafted 
in the conjunctive and the government focused its efforts at 
trial on only one of the three alternative mental states. 
According to defendants, such circumstances take this case 
out of the routine case in which a general unanimity charge 
will ensure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis 
for a conviction, even where an indictment alleges 
numerous factual bases for criminal liability. See United 
States v. Beros, 833 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1987). We 
disagree. 
 
In United States v. Cusumano, 943 F.2d 305 (3d Cir. 
1991), the defendant was indicted under a statute that lists 
multiple routes to a conviction in the disjunctive. As in the 
present case, while the language of the indictment was 
written in the conjunctive, the district court charged the 
jury in the disjunctive. Cusumano challenged his conviction 
under this charge, arguing that the court should have 
charged the jury in the conjunctive, and, failing that, the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
substantial difference between plowing funds back into an illegal 
narcotics business and avoiding currency transaction reporting 
requirements. Even if true, under Schad, we need only find that the 
equivalence could ever reasonably be found. We believe that there is no 
significant disparity in blameworthiness between promoting illegal 
activity and avoiding a requirement to report financial transactions 
associated with that activity, since avoiding the reporting requirements 
often promotes the continuation of the illegal activity. 
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district court should have given a specific unanimity 
instruction under Beros (i.e., informing the jury that they 
must be unanimous in concluding that he had committed 
one of the disjunctive acts). We rejected both claims, noting 
first that "the general rule is that when a jury returns a 
guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the 
conjunctive . . . the verdict stands if the evidence is 
sufficient with respect to any of the acts charged." Id. at 
311. We held that this rule extends to cases where the 
indictment is in the conjunctive, but the jury instructions 
were in the disjunctive. Id. Furthermore, we found that 
since Cusumano's case did not involve allegations of 
different sets of facts, the only possible jury confusion arose 
from the disjunctive nature of the jury charge under the 
statute. Cusumano, 943 F.2d at 312. We concluded that 
there was an insufficient risk of jury confusion under such 
circumstances to trigger the need for a specific unanimity 
instruction. Id. This case is quite analogous. In light of 
Cusumano, we do not believe that defendants have 
demonstrated plain error here. 
 
E. Conclusion 
 
For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
application of the Schad-Edmonds test to the present 
statute yields the conclusion that it is neither clear nor 
obvious that the three alternative mental states defined in 
S1956 could not properly be treated as separate means of 
committing a single offense. We find especially persuasive 
the reasoning in Holmes that the point of the money 
laundering statute is to punish a financial transaction 
involving known illicit proceeds, accomplished for a guilty 
purpose. That multiple purposes could satisfy this end does 
not mean that Congress intended to create multiple offenses.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. To the contrary, like the court in Holmes we find problematic the 
obvious import of defendants' position -- namely, that a subsequent 
defendant could be convicted of two different money laundering offenses 
based on the same transaction simply because he knew that his 
prohibited conduct was designed for two unlawful purposes. See Holmes, 
44 F.3d at 1155. Take, for example, the situation in which a defendant 
deposits proceeds from an investment fraud scam into a bank account, 
and then purchases a cashier's check on that account which he uses to 
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Therefore, under a plain error standard of review, no 
specific unanimity instruction was necessary. 
 
We recognize that the Paramo footnote could potentially 
be read to the contrary. We believe, however, that the 
relevant language in that footnote is unclear as to its 
import, and it does not control our decision in this case 
where we review for plain error. We have indicated why, 
under the Schad-Edmonds analysis, we think that 
defendants' interpretation of the Paramo footnote is wrong. 
We leave, however, to another day (or to the en banc court) 
the task of definitive interpretation. 
 
Issue 3 - Did the government present insufficient 
evidence to convict Nunez of conspiring to launder money? 
 
When a conviction is challenged on sufficiency of 
evidence grounds, we must "view the evidence in the light 
most favorable to the verdict, and must presume that the 
jury has properly carried out its functions." United States v. 
Coleman, 811 F.2d 804, 807 (3rd Cir. 1987) (citations 
omitted). A defendant seeking to overturn a verdict for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
pay off a mortgage on a piece of property which he owns. Further 
suppose that while much of the property is used for legitimate purposes, 
the defendant also conducts his investment scam from an office on the 
property. This transaction could satisfy the conceal or disguise prong of 
S1956(a)(1), and it could potentially also satisfy the promotion prong, 
since by paying off the mortgage, the defendant was able to continue to 
use the office and conduct his fraudulent venture. See United States v. 
Wilson, 77 F.3d 105 (5th Cir. 1996) (purchase of house with drug 
proceeds could satisfy both promotion and concealment prongs); United 
States v. Johnson, 971 F.2d 562 (10th Cir. 1992) (sufficient evidence to 
satisfy promotion prong when defendant uses illicit proceeds to pay 
mortgage on his home, which includes office used to conduct fraudulent 
venture). Similarly, if the same defendant purchased a high-priced 
automobile in the name of a phony corporation and used that 
automobile to impress potential victims and encourage them to 
contribute to his sham investments, both the promotion and conceal or 
disguise prongs could be satisfied. Id. If we accepted defendants' logic, 
our hypothetical defendant could be convicted of two separate crimes in 
each instance. But see Wilson, 77 F.3d at 108-09 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(upholding conviction under S1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and S1956(a)(1)(A)(i) based 
on same transaction). 
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insufficient evidence "bears a heavy burden." United States 
v. Carr, 25 F.3d 1194, 1201 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations 
omitted). 
 
To sustain a conspiracy charge, "the government can rely 
entirely on circumstantial evidence to prove" the conspiracy 
as long as the inferences drawn from the circumstantial 
evidence "have a logical and convincing connection to the 
facts established." Id. at 1201 (citations omitted). The 
government must prove that the conspirators had"a unity 
of purpose, an intent to achieve a common goal, and an 
agreement to work together." Id. at 1201. In order to 
sustain a conviction for conspiracy to launder money, 
Conley requires the government to establish (1) a 
conspiracy to launder money was entered into by two or 
more people; (2) one of the conspirators committed an overt 
act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (3) the defendant knew 
the purpose of the conspiracy; and (4) the defendant 
deliberately joined the conspiracy. Conley, 37 F.3d at 976- 
977.7 
 
In this case, the government established the first element 
of the existence of the conspiracy through the testimony of 
Robert and Rosario Foti. These two leaders of the 
conspiracy made it clear that a conspiracy existed. They 
also admitted that they engaged in a number of overt acts 
to further the conspiracy. Nunez, as to the third element, 
denies that he knew the purpose of the conspiracy. The 
evidence against him is that he was present in an 
automobile when Robert Foti and another person were 
discussing the conspiracy. Upon his arrest, Nunez informed 
a U.S. Customs officer that he was aware he was receiving 
drug money. Nunez went with Foti to pick up over a half- 
million dollars in cash from a fast-food parking lot. 
Deliveries of this type occurred on various occasions. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The parties have stated the elements the government must prove as 
being different from the Conley test, preferring to rely on Brown. 
However, in Brown, the defendant was contesting his conviction of 
money laundering, whereas Nunez contests his conviction of conspiring 
to launder money. Thus, Conley is the more accurate statement of the 
elements the government must satisfy. 
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Nunez now attempts to discredit each piece of evidence 
against him. Such attempts are futile; we do not weigh the 
evidence. Instead, we determine only if enough evidence 
was presented upon which a jury could convict. Nunez's 
admission to the U.S. Customs officer that he knew he was 
receiving drug money is enough to establish his knowledge 
of the conspiracy. Nunez's participation in picking up and 
counting thousands of dollars of cash from fast-food 
parking lots is further evidence from which a reasonable 
jury could conclude Nunez was aware of the purpose of the 
conspiracy. The government also showed that Nunez 
deliberately joined the conspiracy. By arranging to pick up 
hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash from fast-food 
parking lots, Nunez deliberately furthered the conspiracy, 
and thus joined it. 
 
Therefore, Nunez's request for a new trial is denied. 
 
V. Other Grounds 
 
The defendants also argue they are entitled to a new trial 
because of the ineffective assistance of counsel, newly- 
discovered evidence, prosecutorial misconduct, and an 
improper willful blindness jury instruction. All of these 
issues were adequately addressed by the district court in its 
post-trial order denying the defendants' motion for a new 
trial. None of these contentions merits any further 
consideration. 
 
We AFFIRM the rulings of the district court. 
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